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hile some are inclined to search more deeply 
than others for the most appropriate way to 
lead a human life, any person who takes up the 
question "how should I live?" exhibits a kind of 
ethical concern. Further along the line of inquiry into how one 
should live one's life, one may ask, "what is my nature as a 
human being?" "what is the good in a human life?" or "what, if 
anything, is required of me as a human being?" To inquire even 
more deeply and indeed more philosophically, one may ask, 
"how is it even possible that I can understand what we call the 
ethical?" 
A collision of thoughts on these questions is presented in 
Alan Donagan's The Theory of Morality. At the end of Chapter 
Four, Donagan briefly levels what appears to be a deft and 
important criticism at what he takes to be. existentialist doctrine. 
Donagan uses R. G. Collingwood's concept of "corrupt con­
sciousness" to describe the kind of mentality of which he believes 
the existentialist thought of Heidegger and Sartre is an expres­
sion. Donagan believes that existentialist doctrine requires only 
one thing of man: that he see /I through the pretense that anything 
is required of man as such, other than that he act in full aware­
ness of the fact that he is mortal and that nothing is required of 
him" (Theory of Morality, 142). In terms of existentialism, this 
paper is concerned not at all with Sartre but mainly with Heideg­
ger. With respect to Heidegger, it is not part of the project of his 
phenomenological explica tion of human existence to uncover or 
create a prescription for a way of living a moral life.1 But this 
does not necessarily mean that because of his phenomenological 
findings in which he did not bring forth any ethical requirements 
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for living that he does not see that man is free from ethics and 
free to do whatever he wants. That Heidegger does not bring 
forth a binding ethical requirement in Being and Time does not 
warrant the criticism that his is an expression of corrupt con­
sciousness. To get these concerns clear, first, one must under­
stand Donagan's conception of human beings as rational crea­
tures, and the kind of morality which follows from valuing 
rationality as an intrinsic good. Then I will bring out his com­
ments on Heidegger. Once Donagan's criticisms of authenticity 
are clear, it will be necessary to understand Heidegger's concep­
tions of conscience, authenticity, and his thoughts on moral 
requirement or obligation. My goal is to make a good and fair 
assessment of the legitimacy of Donagan's criticisms of Heideg­
ger's thought. 
Although Donagan conceives of human nature as consist­
ing in our moral and intellectual fallibility, he also sees rationality 
as the fundamental part of our nature. Donagan's formulation of 
what he takes to be traditional Judeo-Christian morality rests on 
the intrinsic value of rationality.2 According to Donagan, al­
though traditional Judeo-Christian morality is not necessarily 
theologically-dependent, it is a system of laws or precepts bind­
ing on rational creatures as such, and the content of this morality 
is ascertainable by human reason. The fundamental principle of 
traditional Judeo-Christian morality as Donagan eventually for­
mulates it is that one must respect rationality in all rational 
agents such that" it is impermissible not to respect every human 
being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature" (Donagan, 66). 
Donagan establishes this principle by appealing to reason itself: 
to be rational and to act rationally is to accept t.his fundamental 
principle; to reject the fundamental principle is to reject rational­
ity as an end in itself. 
Donagan arrives at the fundamental principle in this way: 
if one respects one's own rationality then it follows that one must 
respect it in all others since rationality is not a property exclusive 
to oneself. Donagan argues that this fundamental principle is 
accessible to all humans in virtue of their rationality; the funda­
mental principle is, in the Cartesian sense, clear and distinct to 
rational thought. Since the fundamental principle is accessible to 
all rational creatures, the principle and its subsequent moral 
49 Donagan and Heidegger 
precepts are binding on all rational creatures because of the 
intrinsic value of rationality: in virtue of the fact that one values 
one's own rationality, it follows that one values it in others 
because rationality is a property held by all rational creatures. 
Thus, by the fundamental principle of morality, one is morally 
bound to respect the rationality in all rational creatures, includ­
ing oneself. In this sense, insofar as one is rational, one is required 
to respect other rational creatures. 
Donagan's conception of conscience also plays a role in 
the way one understands the permissibility or impermissibility of 
one's own actions and one's own culpability or inculpability as a 
rational actor. For Donagan, conscience is reason's apprehension 
of its own principles, or to put it more colloquially, it is the part of 
one's consciousness which says 1/ According to my principles, as I 
understand them, I think this is right." Donagan seems to agree 
with the Thomistic conception of conscience: "the verdicts of 
conscience derive from a disposition of ordinary human reason/,3 
(Donagan, 134) where conscience has the character of a kind of 
"court of justice," in the Kantian sense (Heidegger, 293). [Page 
references in Heidegger are to the standard German edition of 
Bein.g and Time, Ed.] This disposition, in the Thomistic sense, is 
developed through a kind of moral education, or, in other words, 
through incorporating the fundamental moral principles into 
one's consciousness.' According to Donagan, since the fundamen­
tal principle is clear and distinct to reason, and since conscience 
gives a kind of verdict for what one ought to do, then it is an 
appeal to determine how one ought to act. So in all cases it is 
/I culpable to act against conscience" (Donagan, 138). The verdicts 
from conscience determine the permissibility or impermissibility 
of an action and whether or not we act according to that verdict 
determines our culpability. 
Donagan brings out a human complication for acting 
according to conscience when, in light of the thought of Colling­
wood, he asserts that "the moral conscience may be vitiated by a 
corrupt consciousness" (Donagan, 141). It is at this point in his 
book that he criticizes existentialist doctrine as being an expres­
sion of a corrupt consciousness. For Donagan, the corrupt con­
sciousness consists in rejecting what Donagan posits as the truth 
of one's moral requirements as a human being, i.e. regarding the 
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fundamental principle as not really binding on all rational crea­
tures. According to Donagan, existentialism is an expression of a 
corrupt consciousness because it alleges that nothing is required 
of man except that he If see through the pretense" that anything 
moral is required of him. The corruption of consciousness is a 
possible psychical phenomenon because according to Donagan, 
If a man will be aware or not aware of what is presented to his 
consciousness according as he pays attention to it or not, and that 
it is in his power to withdraw attention from most of what is 
presented to him" (Donagan, 139). In Donagan's thought, even in 
matters of conscience wherein every human knows in some deep 
part of his or her soul that he or she is morally bound or obligated 
to respect rationality in all humans and so live according to the 
fundamental principle, a human can nevertheless control what 
appears to his or her consciousness. Consequently, one may shirk 
that which one most deeply knows to be morally required of him 
or her. What needs to be shown is that Donagan is not justified in 
criticizing Heideggerian thought in the manner in which he has 
understood it. Is it actually Heidegger's thought that nothing is 
required of man other than that he recognize his own mortality?4 
Donagan's criticisms of Heidegger reveal his misunderstandings 
of Heidegger. Now I will turn to understand Heidegger so that 
one may better see what Donagan did not see so clearly. 
Donagan has a certain idea of what existentialist doctrine 
consists in and, more specifically, he has his own idea of what 
authenticity means: existentialist doctrine requires human beings 
to be authentic which "consists neither more nor less than in 
seeing through the pretense that anything is required of man as 
such, other than that he act in full awareness of the fact that he is 
mortal and that nothing is required of him" (Donagan, 142). It is 
understandable that one could conceive of existentialism in these 
terms and make the following criticisms of it: it tends to under­
mine ethics; it necessarily leads to nihilism; those who espouse 
existentialist doctrine do so by shirking their inherent moral 
responsibility as human beings. One may also further conclude 
justly that these existentialists then share in common a corrupt 
consciousness. If one grants that Donagan's interpretation of 
Heidegger's conception of authenticity is accurate and that Hei­
degger's thought is representative of existentialist doctrine, then 
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by all means Donagan's criticisms of each are warranted. But has 
Donagan conceived of authenticity in a way faithful to what 
Heidegger meant by it? Is Heidegger actually formulating exis­
tential doctrine? Does Heidegger actually say that a moral 
requirement or obligqtion is a "pretense"? Moreover, does Hei­
degger ever say that humans are required to see through this 
pretense or be or do anything at all? What does Heidegger say 
concerning moral requirements or obligations? 
Authenticity is an important and incidentally an easily 
misunderstood concept in Heidegger's thought since its meaning 
appears deep and manifold. As Donagan understands it, authen­
ticity represents a way of living in which one understands oneself 
as being required to do nothing else but see one's selfhood as 
consisting in absolute freedom,S and that man be nothing else but 
true to himself about his actions and mindful of his own mortal­
ity. Donagan would seem to think that in being authentic, one 
places more value on being true to oneself than on being moral. 
This understanding of authenticity is very limited and in many 
ways not even faithful to what Heidegger meant when he used 
the term. What I take authenticity to mean in the way Heidegger 
uses the term is as follows: authenticity is the mode ofbeing to which 
Dasein is called by conscience out of inauthenticity to a recognition of 
one's own being in the world which consists in attesting to one's 
primordial guilt and understanding death as the ultimate possibility of 
life. Heidegger uses 1/ authenticity" as a phenomenological de­
scription of a certain mode of being; it is not an evaluative 
term--being authentic entails no necessary moral implications 
one way or the other. Now, it is understandable that Donagan 
may criticize the lack of moral implications of authenticity. Dona­
gan may think that the amoral nature of the concept of authentic­
ity implicates it as an expression of a corrupt consciousness; in 
other words, for Donagan, this means that by being morally 
neutral, the authentic mode of being would purport to slough off 
the moral reqUirements which bind all rational creatures. But 
Donagan's criticism may be better addressed once we have un­
derstood Heidegger's concept of conscience. 
In terms of conscience, authenticity is a kind of condition 
for the possibility of Dasein's understanding a moral injunction. 
Only on the basis of authenticity does an ethics even become 
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possible for Dasein. In the preliminary analysis from Being and 
Time of conscience and guilt, Heidegger makes explicit the three 
negativities of Dasein and these negativities are what constitute 
the nullity of Dasein. Dasein is a nullity in that Dasein lacks in 
three ways: 
1) With respect to the past, Dasein is fraught with a sense 
of lacking because Dasein was thrown into the world 
without having chosen to be put in the world. Heidegger 
writes, /lIn the structure of throwness ... essentially lies a 
nullity" where throwness is a kind of abandonment 
which Dasein senses in being in the world (285). 
2) In the present, Dasein is lacking because Dasein is 
ordinarily not his or her true authentic selfi in fact, for the 
most part Dasein is falling from his or her own authentic 
self in that Dasein is most often taken in by the /I they-self" 
where the they-self is characterized by being in such a 
way that one is not individual. One acts in the mode of 
being nobody in particular. 
3) In the future, Dasein also lacks because he/ she knows 
that in time he/ she is not to be at all. In fact, Dasein knows 
that he/ she is destined to die. "In the structure of...the 
project essentially lies a nullity" where project is a kind of 
throwing forth into the future and understanding of what 
is to come (285). 
Because of these negativities, Dasein's being lies in nul­
lity.6 Because Dasein's being lies in nullity, Dasein is left with this 
primordial guilt without even explicitly knowing it.7 What is the 
connection between guilt and lacking? " .. . [G]uilt is ... necessar­
ily defined as a lack, when something which ought to be and can 
be is missing" (283). What Dasein understands that he/she can 
be and ought to be is authentic.s To be authentic, Dasein must 
come back from the they-self to which Dasein ordinarily falls 
prey. It is in Dasein's recognition that he/she ordinarily falls 
from his/her own authentic self to the '''they'' that he/she is 
guilty.9 What Dasein could be is authentic but since Dasein is for 
the most part falling into the inauthenticity of the they-self, 
insofar as Dasein lacks authenticity, he/she is gUilty. Because 
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Dasein is primordially guilty amidst the three negativities it 
becomes possible for him/her to be called back in authenticity to 
recognize his/her nullity. In understanding the call of conscience 
back to being authentic, Dasein understands him/herself as 
wanting to have a conscience, in fact "Dasein calls itself to itself" 
(254). If Dasein did not want to hear a summons of conscience, 
Dasein could not understand a moral injunction. Let me explain 
further. 
An"analysis of conscience reveals it as a call" (269). What 
is the /I call"? The call is a call from oneself back to the authentic 
wherein one recognizes one's being as lacking in the way that I 
have described above. "Call" is a summons to attest to one's 
primordial guilt where, as clarified above, Dasein is called back 
to itself to recognize in authenticity its own guilt. Being able to 
/I Understand the summons means: wanting to have a conscience" 
(265). In wanting to have a conscience Dasein wants to come back 
to authenticity instead of falling prey to the "they-self." How 
does conscience relate to guilt? Heidegger says, "Wanting to have 
aconscience is rather the most primordial existential presupposition for 
the possibility of becoming factically guilty" (288). Because Dasein 
wants to have a conscience which means that Dasein wants to be 
called back to authenticity, it is then possible for Dasein to be 
guilty about lacking authenticity. This primordial kind of guilt 
then precedes obligation, including moral obligation. 
In another part of Being and Time, Heidegger characterizes 
"authentically understanding the call [to authenticity] as wanting 
to have a conscience" (272). In a primordial sense, Dasein wants 
a conscience. If it was not "given" (or factical) that Dasein is 
primordially guilty (what Heidegger calls factically guilty) then 
Dasein would not be able to hear the call of conscience. If Dasein 
did not experience this factical, primordial guilt, he/she would 
not be able to "hear" the call of conscience or any kind of a moral 
injunction. Being guilty avails the hearing of the call of con­
science. Before any particular moral injunction comes, Dasein is 
factically constituted such that he/she is the kind of being that 
can hear a moral injunction: Dasein is fundamentally guilty 
because he/she falls away from his/her particular self to inau­
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thenticity. Consequently, one needs to be called back to authen· 
ticity. Because Dasein falls away from authenticity, Dasein is 
guilty and so he/she wants to have a conscience. 
Whether or not the authentic mode of being permits 
immorality or morality is not a question that one would ask if one 
has already understood the character of authenticity the way it is 
used in its primordial sense. My point is that the authentic mode 
of being is valuatively neutral, and not at all an existentialist 
requirement for living, as Donagan would try to conceive of 
it-~authenticity is not morally prescribed by anything or anyone; 
being authentic is not a command. Properly understood, in an 
authentic mode of being, Dasein understands the call of con­
science and in so doing it recognizes its wanting to be authentic; 
in hearing the call of conscience, Dasein is summoned to be 
guilty. As I am about to show in what follows, this guilt precedes 
indebtedness and obligation; because we are guilty, we can be 
obligated-in short, because of Dasein's primordial guilt, an 
ethics becomes possible. Now, one can begin to see a conception 
of authenticity which is quite different from Donagan's charge 
that authenticity requires that man see through the pretense of 
ethical requirements. 
So far one may have an idea of how it is that guilt 
precedes obligation thus making a moral injunction understand~ 
able to the being of Dasein. But to grasp better what Heidegger 
means by this we must make a different attempt to understand 
guilt as the basis of a sense of indebtedness. Then subsequently it 
will become somewhat more explicit how on the basis of primor~ 
dial guilt, obligation and, subsequently, morality become possi­
ble. Heidegger says: "being guilhJ does not result from an indebted­
ness, but the other way around: indebtedness is possible only Ion the 
basis' of a primordial being guilty" (284). In being primordially 
guilty, Dasein is in a certain way indebted. This indebtedness 
expresses itself as needing something. I established that 'because 
of Dasein's nullity, he is primordially guilty, and then because he 
is guilty he wants to hear the call of conscience. In a similar way 
because of his sense of guilt-based indebtedness, it is possible for 
Dasein to feel obligated. The fundamental lacking, which is just 
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factically part of being Dasein, means that there is a primordial 
guilt prior to being obligated. Heidegger explicates the primor­
dial guilt which is a part of being in the worldJ and primordial 
guilt makes it possible for Dasein to understand a moral injunction. 
Because of primordial guilt, one can feel obligated and subse­
quently one can recognize an It ought." Perhaps this can be under­
stood in the following question: How can a being recognize a 
moral injunction if it is not at first in some sense open to it? 
Dasein is open to be obligated because of his primordial guilt; 
this guilt begets indebtedness and thus makes moral obligation 
possible. . 
The authentic mode of being is necessary for the possibil­
ity of an ethics for Dasein. Dasein cannot hear the call of con­
science amidst the" noise of the manifold ambiguity of everyday 
Inewl idle talk" of the inauthentic they-self. The call of conscience 
must call to Dasein in its authenticity so that Dasein may hear it. 
Thus, in this. way, authenticity is a condition for hearing a moral 
injunction; away from the idle chatter of the inauthentic they-selfJ 
in silencel Dasein may hear a moral injunction. This is qUite 
different from conceiving of authenticity as a call to see through 
the pretense of moral obligation. 
In ending his criticism of authenticity, Donagan says: 
"...moral nihilism is but one more of the innumerable devices by 
which a corrupt consciousness may disguise from a man what he 
is, and how he is called to live" (Donagan, 142). W11at is impor­
tant here in light of the prior discussion is Donagan's idea of how 
a man is Ii called to live." For Donagan, man is called to live in 
such a way that he is morally bound to value rationality as an end 
in itself, and respect rationality in all rational creatures. But how 
is it that man can understand what he is "calledll to do by the 
fundamental principle of morality? Where Donagan begins his 
theory ofmorality with a moral injunction in the form of the fundamen­
tal principle, Heidegger explicates how it is possible for any moral 
injunction to be understood at all. Whence the need to turn to a 
universalized fundamental principle? Because Dasein already 
lacks. How is it that the fundamental principle can be understood 
as a moral injunction? It can be understood because Dasein is 
already guilty and subsequently indebted and disposed to being 
obligated. In his phenomenological explication of being in the 
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world, Heidegger describes how lacking is fundamental to Da-:­
sein. And this fundamental lack is what eventually makes an 
ethics possible. 
The absence of a moral requirement binding on all human 
beings in his phenomenological explication does not mean that 
authenticity is an expression of a corrupt consciousness. To the 
contrary, Heidegger explicates authenticity in non-valuative 
terms for methodological reasons: he is trying to get Dasein clear 
on itself, so that it may be free from the distractions which 
characterize being lost in the inauthentic /I they-self" so that in its 
own authentic mode of being it can recognize its own primordial 
guilt and hear the call of conscience, and thereby be open to 
understanding a moral injunction. Also important to note is that 
it is nowhere written in Being and Time that in being authentic 
anything moral or otherwise is required of a human being, not 
even /I seeing through the pretense that anything is required of 
man" (Donagan, 142). Far from saying that moral requirements 
are pretenses, in an authentic mode of being Dasein can hear a 
moral injunction in a most primordial way. Because of conscience 
and authenticity, Dasein can be obligated and recognize a moral 
injunction. Finally, it is possible for Dasein to understand the 
meaning of the ethical, and Dasein may begin to discern how a 
life ought to be lived. tO 
Notes 
I An example of an ethical prescription of this sort is seen most clearly 
in Kant's conception of the categorical imperative in which one's own 
reason commands One to act morally. 
2 Conceived in this way, rationality consists in understanding the struc­
tures ofmeans and ends and of being able to recognize and be dissatis­
fied with contradictions. 
3 Synderesis is the faculty from which verdicts of conscience proceed 
(Donagan, 132). 
41 wish Donagan would have given a footnote indicating where in Hei­
degger's literature he found this claim that Heidegger says that man is 
only required to see through all pretenses that anything is required of 
man at all. 
sI know this is plainly Sartre's conception but Donagan makes no dis­
tinction or specification of it one way or another. In fact, Donagan per­
ilously and erroneously confiates the thought of Sartre and Heidegger. 
The truth is that Heidegger's thought is original and unique and conse­
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-quentlv different from S~rtdreh's. W?hile Sh~rtre defined his thought as ex-
istenti~list, Heidegger sal t at nelt er IS thought nor he himself were 
existentialist. 
!\ 'The being of Dasein which is "care" is "itself in its essence thor­
hly permeated with nullity" (285).
gou . d' I h- "Being guilty is more pnm~r. Ia t an any knowing about it" (286). 
S Dasein understands authentIcIty as what he/she ought to be where the 
word "ought" is not used in any moral or normative sense. Dasein is 
just constituted such that he i~ ~rimordia~ly ~uilty be~ause he character­
istically falls short of authenticIty by fallIng 1Oto the mauthentic they-
self. 
9 "The calling back in which conscience calls forth gives Dasein to un­
derstand that Dasein itself-as the null ground of its null project, stand­
ing in the possibility of its being-must bring itself back to itself from 
its lostness in the they, and this means that it is guilty" (287). 
10 I would like to acknowledge Professor Sessions' indispensable help 
in revising this paper for pUblication. Also Professor Pemberton's time 
and invaluable insights, both of which helped me better understand 
Heideggerian thought. 
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